Interview with Andrew Lambert, author of Franklin: Tragic Hero of
Polar Navigation.
RP = Russell Potter
AL = Andrew Lambert
RP: So what was it that first drew
you to study the life and achievements of Sir John Franklin?
AL:
As a historian of the 19th C. Royal Navy the story of Sir John Franklin was
always in the background, a tragic tale of suffering and death that ran
alongside the Navy's mainstream activities. Finally in August and September
2004 I was offered the chance to go to the Arctic and retrace part of the story
on the ground, working with John Murray of Crossing the Line Films, and
Director Peter Bate, whom I had worked with before. The combination of a rapid
re-read of the main Franklin texts, especially Richard Cyriax's book, and the
experience of the expedition turned curiosity into a book.
RP: When
you visited some of the Franklin sites for the filming, did you find that
actually standing on the ground where Franklin and his men died made a
difference in your feeling or approach to the subject?
AL:
Getting to Point Victory, Erebus
Bay, Cape Felix, Terror Bay and Starvation Cove brought home the sheer
desolation of the west coast of King William Island, and the overland journey
emphasized just how a hundred miles is in that part of the world. It also
provided a month of totally focused time in the Arctic to think about Franklin
and discuss the subject with two enthusiasts and a local expert. Standing at
Point Victory brings it all home, this is the worst place on earth….
RP: I’d certainly agree with you there. The vast flatness and emptiness of that
quarter of King William Island is
simply staggering. But back to
your book: you've placed considerable emphasis on the
centrality of magnetic observations in authorizing and planning
the Franklin expedition. This would have involved the setting up of
magnetic observatories on pre-set "term dates" in order to make
global comparisons. Could you explain this system a bit further?
AL: The Global magnetic project that had
been running for two decades involved a chain of fixed and mobile observatories
around the world, primarily in the British Empire. Using the latest Gaussian
theory and measuring systems, and newly refined instruments the international
project was due to expire in 1846. The ‘term dates’ were the days on which
specific observations of magnetic intensity, direction and variation were to be
taken across the world at set times, to generate a global magnetic chart.
RP
One
more "magnetic" question: Rear Admiral Noel
Wright, writing on Franklin in the late 1950's, placed a similar emphasis on
Franklin's magnetic mission. He believed that a substantial observatory,
manned over a long period, would have been established near the North Magnetic
Pole, and believed that some misfortune occurring to this (necessarily)
officer-rich party was to blame for the disproportionate number of deaths among
officers as of the 1848 record. He even believed that Franklin would
likely have been buried there. What do you think of his hypotheses?
AL:
I think Wright was correct to
emphasise the magnetic mission, and there is a large square of stones at Cape
Felix, the closest land point to the magnetic pole on King William Island. I
suspect this was the site of the main observatory – which had to be
ashore as the ships were heavily magnetized by the engines and other fittings.
Franklin could have been buried anywhere, at sea, on land, in the ship’s hold,
at Point Victory, or Cape Felix. But no-one has ever found any evidence, so it
remains mystery.
RP: Crozier biographer
Michael Smith has described Francis Crozier as "the Navy's most
experienced magnetic authority still on active service," and noted that he
was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1843 largely on the basis of his
'untiring assiduity' in the field of terrestrial magnetism. And yet, in your
book, you don't say much about Crozier's strangely lessened role in the
expedition's most vital work, save to suggest that he may not have been, as it
were, held in reserve for later work. What's your sense of the role his
selection played for the expedition as a whole?
AL: Crozier was an
experienced magnetic observer, and that ensured he was taken and would have
directed land-based observations once the ships were locked in the ice.
Fitzjames was given charge of them at sea because Franklin and Crozier were
ultimately responsible for their ships. He was not the ‘most experienced’ that
would be Franklin, a magnetic observer since his time with Flinders in 1802-3.
He was elected FRS in the 1820s. Appointing Crozier demonstrated that he was an
experienced and highly capable officer, a friend and a way of recognising James
Clark Ross’s role in the securing Franklin the command. The observation records
would have revealed Crozier’s role more clearly – but he and Graham Gore
were the best men to assist Franklin. That said Fitzjames has more experience
than his letters imply – with the Chesney Euphrates Expedition.
RP: In connection with my last question,
it's been noted by many that Fitzjames, who had personal connections with Sir
John Barrow, was given the surprising role of selecting the junior officers,
which would ordinarily have been Crozier's. You note that this meant that
very few men with Arctic experience were chosen; do you think this may have
been a factor in the expedition's failure?
AL:
Crozier chose his own first
lieutenant, but Franklin left Fitzjames to pick the other junior officers as
expedition leader. This was normal naval practice.
I do not think the expedition was a
‘failure’. It failed to return home, but we have to assume that it succeeded in
completing the magnetic mission. The officers were of a high quality, and with
three arctic veterans, ice masters and some experienced seamen there is no need
to seek human causation. Changeable weather and ice patterns, scurvy and
starvation are adequate, with the added benefits of tuberculosis and pneumonia.
RP: I note that you are quickly (and eloquently) dismissive of the
more popular Franklin monomanias of lead-poisoning, botulism, and the
like. And yet, might not these things theories have something to
contribute, taken in context? As a follow-up, do you see more of value
that could be learned from archaeological and/or forensic work generally?
AL: Monocausal
explanations for large scale disasters may appeal to some, but this was a
complex catastrophe. Owen Beattie did not say that lead poisoning killed them,
and there is no evidence for botulism, but there is plenty for TB, pneumonia,
scurvy and cannibalism. As lawyer by training I always err towards the known
and the simple when examining evidence. No theory that requires complex
scenarios can be persuasive without strong evidence. The archaeology has given
up a lot of evidence, and it all points the same way. More evidence may turn
up, but until it does I’m happiest with the standard version: scurvy,
starvation and cannibalism, although I would add that there is evidence for a
virulent strain of TB.
RP: Was your decision not
to tackle the Inuit testimony on Franklin's men in detail based more on a sense
that this evidence was of uncertain trustworthiness, or that it was too complex
and too fraught with ambiguity to be readily digested? As a follow-up: do
you feel that David C. Woodman's work with this evidence has added something to
our understanding of Franklin?
AL: My treatment of
the Inuit testimony reflects a close study of David Woodman’s work, and Charles
Hall’s methods. It is not criticism to say that Hall did not collect his
evidence according to modern oral history standards, he led the witnesses, and
may have underestimated the willingness of his hosts to oblige him in their
answers. He was also, to put it mildly, somewhat unbalanced. You could never
secure a conviction by relying on those witnesses. I think David Woodman’s work
is highly important. It has given the Inuit back their integrity, their
accounts of cannibalism were true, and it has raised the possibility that the
disaster was more complex and long drawn out than the older accounts argued. It
fundamentally changed the course of Franklin scholarship. That said my book
demonstrates that I am not persuaded. The evidence is consistent with a single
abandonment, and a collapsing march south. The jury is out.
RP:
What do you think it is that has made Franklin a
subject of such enduring fascination over the past 160 years and more? If
the "Erebus" or "Terror" were to be found, do you think it
would diminish or intensify this interest?
AL: The Franklin story
has fascinated and horrified for over 160 years because, like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein,
it has everything: Horror, ice, blasphemy and mystery. We still don’t know the
full story, and I suspect we never will. Finding the Erebus and Terror would
spark a great deal of interest, but it wouldn’t add much to the story. There
would be no paperwork to explain how they were lost, leaving them as mute as
the tragic skeletal remains of the expedition that litter the route of the
death march. It may be as well
that we do not know it all: we need a few mysteries to keep the past alive.