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Documents : Introduction
to Supplemental Documents
These supplemental documents provide
more detail regarding the Americanization of the Vietnam War. The first
group of documents are concerned with the
French withdrawal from Indochina through the Geneva Accords of July
1954 and the formation of the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO) that
became
the legal instrument by which the United States Americanized the
War in Vietnam. The second group of documents help further illuminate our
understanding of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the various contingencies
surrounding the decision making process that led to the insertion
of
close to 184,000 American soldiers by the end of 1965.
By 1954 the French position in Vietnam had become untenable. Presaged by
the stunning defeats at Cao Bang in 1950, and the Viet Minh’s occupation
of most of the countryside in Vietnam had greatly reduced French political
authority within the country. Renewed hopes for a French victory seemed dim.
Central to the French strategy was an attempt to interdict supplies coming
from Laos and bringing on a conventional battle with the Viet Minh with the
establishment of a garrison of 12,000 men at Dien Bien Phu in Northwest Vietnam.
Their plan was foiled by the Viet Minh under the leadership of General Vo
Nguyen Giap whose forces quickly enveloped the French. This group of documents
begins with a letter from the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault (1). The letter informs Bidault
of the unlikelihood of direct intervention on the part of the United States
to lift the siege at Dien Bien Phu. Instead, Dulles refers to the possibility
of organizing collective security in the area made up of nations having vital
interest in the area. Interestingly, Dulles seems to ignore the then current
popular demand by the French people for an end to the French adventure in
Vietnam, and instead, encourages the French to fight on.
The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 1954 provided for the
neutralization of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (2). Through a compromise engineered
primarily by the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, the
Viet Minh agreed to a temporary division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel.
According to historians George C. Herring and Qiang Zhai China wished to
enhance its international image by appearing to be the peace broker and at
the same time assert authority over an area traditionally considered by the
Chinese to be within their sphere of influence. Herring further asserts that
the Soviets hoped that by preserving French honor they might find a way to
drive a wedge between the NATO allies. Critically important to the Viet Minh,
the declaration called for free elections to be held in Vietnam in July of
1956 under the supervision of an International Supervisory Commission.
The Geneva conference represented a setback for American hopes in the region
and the United States refused to sign the accords, instead issuing a separate
statement promising not to disturb the accords. The SEATO Treaty, September
8, 1954 provided a framework for collective security and identifies Cambodia,
Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam
in the protocol to be assisted economically under Article Three, and under
Article Four be defended from armed aggression (3). This treaty provided the
basis for the United States to thwart the Geneva Accords and openly back
the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, installed after a manufactured referendum that
ousted the French backed ruler Bao Dai in May of 1955. The refusal of the
Diem regime to participate in the national elections, as outlined by the
Geneva Accords, assured that the war would be begin again in earnest, as
it did with the formation of the National Liberation Front in 1960.
Following the United States backed assassination of its “wild card” surrogate
Ngo Diem and his brother in November of 1963, the political situation of
South Vietnam devolved into further chaos. The Kennedy administration’s
attempts to stabilize Vietnam had failed. One coup staged by rival military
factions followed another. Leaving the new President, Lyndon Baines Johnson,
in the unenviable position of choosing between the possibility of a coalition
government being formed between one of the rival factions vying for power
and the National Liberation Front, or providing robust backing for a leader
willing to assist the United States in its goal to contain communism from
spreading in Southeast Asia. The latter choice would almost certainly involve
the insertion of more American military personnel. In his Draft Memorandum
to President Johnson, the special Assistant for National Security Affairs
McGeorge Bundy, recommends the use of graduated military force against North
Vietnam should diplomatic efforts fail in reaching a resolution to the current
crisis (4). Civil rights and the upcoming presidential election loom large in
his discussion as to when to obtain congressional backing for such a policy.
Note the similarity and differences between the draft resolution and what
would become the Tonkin Gulf Resolution that follows later.
On August 2, 1965 while in support of covert operations off the coast of
North Vietnam the American destroyer Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese
torpedo boats and subsequently drove them off with the help of air support
from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga. A second attack on the Maddox and
a second destroyer, the Turner Joy, reported on August 4, 1965 most likely
never occurred. Angered by the first incident and perhaps being provided
with the opportunity for rallying support for the more belligerent policy
towards North Vietnam then being considered by the Johnson administration,
an order to respond to the second “attack” with retaliatory air
raids was given. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the National Security
Council, August 4, 1965 help set the tone for the Leadership Meeting between
the administration and the congressional leadership that followed immediately
afterwards (5). The meeting is interesting for its lack of definitive information
regarding the incident and the deliberations regarding the ratcheting up
of American military involvement in Vietnam that had begun in 1963 after
the assassination of Diem. The Johnson administration’s handling of
the congressional leadership had the desired impact and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
was passed on August 10, 1964.
The Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, August 27, 1964 advocates for a strong and forceful course
of action against the North Vietnamese and the insurgency in the south that
includes covert and conventional military action (6). The course of policy included
in this memorandum was largely put on hold until after the presidential election
during which Lyndon Johnson had become the de facto peace candidate in contrast
to his more seemingly pugnacious rival Barry Goldwater. Meanwhile the situation
within Vietnam became more chaotic and a sense of urgency began to pervade
the White House. A series of attacks against American soldiers at Pleiku
on February 6 and Qui Nhon on February 10 set the stage for sustained air
attacks against North Vietnam code named Rolling Thunder.
Arguments against escalating the war had already been eloquently made by
Under Secretary of State George Ball in 1964. Likewise, in August of 1964,
Senator Wayne Morse had made an impassioned attack against passage of the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In his Memorandum to the President, February 17,
1965, Vice President Hubert Humphrey argued against a policy of escalation (7).
Humphrey argued that to pursue such a policy could very well damage the ability
of the administration to carry out Great Society programs. Importantly, he
noted that the lack of legitimacy and the instability of the South Vietnamese
government could easily undermine political support for Johnson’s policy.
Humphrey advocated for a diplomatic settlement, arguing that after the landslide
victory of 1964 the Johnson administration could weather the critique that
would come from pulling away from a policy of engagement in Vietnam and in
the long-term gain from brokering a peace settlement. As in many policy discussions
of Vietnam Humphrey concluded his memo with concerns of a wider war and confrontation
with the Peoples Republic of China.
Humphrey and the internal opponents to the policy of escalation lost their
argument and on March 8, 1965 two marine battalions arrived in Danang to
protect the American airfields in the vicinity. The American strategy now
revolved around the one proposed earlier by General Maxwell Taylor in November
of 1961. Taylor had advocated that American troops be used to take on the
significant fighting against the insurgents and mainline forces of North
Vietnam while the South Vietnamese forces retrained and prepared to take
over the task once the situation was stabilized. The Memorandum from McNamara
to the President April 21, 1965 advocated for the approval of a thirteen-battalion
ground force that would help stave off immediate defeat and allow the South
Vietnamese to regroup (8). The rapid escalation of American forces in Vietnam
began to stoke what would become a significant critique of America’s
conduct on the world stage from a wide range of political factions in the
United States. This group of documents ends with Senator Wayne Morse prescient
warning as to the consequences of the current American policy towards Vietnam
on the anniversary of the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution August 10,
1965 (9).
(1) Source: Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1952-1954,
Volume XIII, Indochina, Part 1 (Washington: The United States Government
Printing Office, 1982).
(2) Source: Dennis Merril and Thomas G. Paterson, ed.,
Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000).
(3) Source: William Appleman Williams et
al. ed., America in Vietnam: A Documentary History (Garden City: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1985).
(4) FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume I, Vietnam 1964 (1992).
(5) ibid.
(6) ibid.
(7) FRUS, Volume II, Vietnam.
(8) ibid.
(9) Congressional Record, Volume III-Part 15, August 10, 1965 to August
18, 1965 (Washington: United States Government Printing
Office).
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